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This thesis represents a case study of the current problems surrounding 
the distribution of oil revenues in Iraq. First, the main problems facing Iraq’s oil 
economy are examined. Second, an assessment is made of the distribution 
system outlined in the Iraqi constitution. Third, based on this assessment, 
arguments are given as to the necessity of a new oil law. A critical area of 
discussion centers on the issue of federalism vs. a strong central government – 
which system best serves the needs of the country in a manner consistent with 
future stability. Based on this discussion, the thesis also examines the feasibility 
of a direct distribution system of oil revenues. Here the main issues center on the 
feasibility of alternative distribution systems and the opposition they may face. 
The thesis concludes by developing the framework for an ideal distribution 
system and proposes possible modifications of the Iraqi Constitution and new 
Iraqi Hydrocarbon/Oil Law. It also recommends eight steps to help achieve a 
solution. 
The study draws on the sources of many scholars, related countries’ 
officials, and the author’s personal observations and thoughts gained while 
serving in and related to Iraq in various missions. 
The purpose of the study is to assist in resolving many of the factions, 
which are currently causing tensions and violence in an area where multiple 
ethnic and sectarian groups are vying for a single strategic resource.  
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“A tsunami of violence is currently engulfing Iraq, characterized by a 
widespread lack of security and law and order. This is accompanied by a lack of 
efficiency in government organizations and a near absence of institutional 
performance or sound management both at the center and, especially, in the 
provinces.”1 A comprehensive approach to the oil economy can solve this serious 
problematic issue. In particular, a healthy and robust oil distribution system can 
bring stability and welfare that should be above all other considerations for that 
country. 
In this context, this thesis examines the current situation in Iraq. In 
particular, it assesses the potential use of fair oil policies to defuse the current 
ethnic tensions, violence, and political instability currently impeding development 
in that country. The role played by oil for the purpose of this study is to help to 
solve the problems that cause tensions and violence to play out in an area where 
multiple ethnic and sectarian groups are vying for a single strategic resource, oil, 
which is also important to external sources.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Questions about oil distribution are currently one of the most important 
issues facing Iraq, its neighboring countries and the United States. “Oil 
production and sales account for nearly 70 percent of Iraq’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), and more than 95 percent of government revenues.”2 In this 
                                            
1 Tariq Shafiq, “Iraq’s Draft Petroleum Law: An Independent Perspective,” Middle East 
Economic Survey XLIX.8, http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/v50n08-5OD01.htm 
(Accessed February 19, 2007). 
2 James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, “The Iraq Study Group Report:The Way Forward-A 
New Approach,” (2006), 
http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/iraq_study_group_report.pdf 
(Accessed February 2, 2007), 22. 
 2
context, the debate about fair oil distribution has intensified. Unfortunately, much 
of the debate about how to distribute the oil is largely being driven by U.S. 
domestic and international politics. Greater attention needs to be given to those 
scenarios that are focused on solving the main economic problems facing the 
country.  
The basic premise throughout this thesis is that oil revenues must be 
equitably distributed if a full-scale civil war is to be avoided. Specifically, if a 
solution including consensus and a fair distribution system is reached, it should 
bring stability and peace to the region and to the world.  
C. ACADEMIC DEBATE AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
"The oil sector and the allocation of its revenues is the critical element in 
shaping both the economic structure and political systems of many countries. In 
this context, a vast literature focuses on the so called ‘oil curse’ or the ‘paradox of 
plenty.’”3 These colorful phrases capture the gist of oil’s potentially destructive 
powers: unless properly managed, oil revenues more often than not undermine 
the economic, political, and social fabric of countries irrespective of how well 
intended their long-term goals and objectives are. The result is often the creation 
of a rentier state mired in corruption, economic mismanagement, and 
authoritarianism.4 Iraq is no exception to this situation. Thus, it is important to 
discuss a fair oil distribution in that country. However, academics, Iraqi leaders 
and government officials, U.S. planners and military minds, as well as key 
regional and global countries, have different approaches to the issue. The main 
debates are centered on which type of government is better for Iraq: a strong 
central government or a federal system.  
“Iraqi’s Kurdish leaders have been particularly aggressive in asserting 
independent control of the oil assets, going as far as signing and implementing 
                                            
3 Robert Looney, “The Economic Challenge: Building a Viable New Iraq,” in After the 
Dictator: the Rebirth of Iraq, Barry Rubin (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), 3. 
4 Ibid. 
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investment deals with foreign oil companies in northern Iraq. Shia Arabs are also 
reported to be negotiating oil investment contracts with foreign companies.”5 
Moreover, Sunni Arabs are opposed to the idea of federalism, and two major 
Shia Arab leaders, Hakim and Sadr, have differed on the key issues of 
federalism and oil distribution.6 
There is also diversification between the U.S. and regional countries. The 
U.S. Department of Defense defines the type of government clearly in its 
proposed timetable to Congress, “such a timetable could lead to changes in the 
political dynamic in Iraq, providing support for the government’s own long-term 
vision: a united, federal, and democratic country, at peace with its neighbors and 
itself.”7  
Turkey has a different policy than the U.S. “Since 1991, Turkish 
governments had pursued a policy that aimed to preserve the territorial integrity 
and unity of Iraq.”8 Abdullah Gül, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, explained Turkey’s policy. 
Iran’s policy is not as clear as that of Turkey’s. However, many experts 
including Joost Hiltermann, the Middle East program director of the International 
Crisis Group, says that Iran supports Shi’a Arabs and desires federalism within 
Iraq. 
Many scholars are also divided on the issue. Some scholars argue that 
partitioning or federalism is already a historical reality, and should not be seen as 
a problem. For example, Nina Kamp, Micheal O'Hanlon and Amy Unikewicz 
                                            
5 Baker and Hamilton, “The Iraq Study Group Report,” 22. 
6 Anthony H. Cordesman, “Iraq’s Sectarian and Ethnic Violence and the Evolving Insurgency: 
Developments through late-January 2007,” Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(January 2007); 4. 
7 U.S. Department of Defense, Quarterly Report to Congress: Measuring Stability and 
Security in Iraq, 2006, 6,9. 
8 Rick Fawn and Raymond Hinnebusch, The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences (Lynn 
Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2006), 204.  
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argue that federalism is needed due to the current situation.9 On the other hand, 
other scholars such as Anthony Cordesman10 and James Cogan11 indicate that 
possible results of such a partition would be the increasing of violence. Daniel L. 
Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack also recommend that the U.S. government avoid 
active support for partition at least for now due to the potential to set off a full-
scale civil war.12  
In addition to the federalism argument, there are proposals from scholars 
to redistribute a portion of Iraq’s oil revenues directly to the population on a per 
capita basis.13 Looney argues that these proposals have the potential to give all 
Iraqi citizens a stake in the nation’s chief natural resource, but it would take time 
to develop a fair distribution system.14 However, no institution in Iraq currently 
exists that could properly implement such a distribution system. “It would take 
substantial time to establish, and would have to be based on a well-developed 
state census and income tax system, which Iraq currently lacks.”15 Additionally,  
 
 
                                            
9 Nina Kamp, Michael O'Hanlon and Amy Unikewicz, “The State of Iraq: An Update,” The 
New York Times, December 20, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/20/opinion/20ohanlon.html?ex=1324270800&en=4b30850d903
8e 720&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (Accessed February 4, 2007).  
10 Anthony H. Cordesman, “Dividing Iraq: Think Long and Hard First,” Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (January 2007), 
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060501_dividingiraq.pdf (Accessed February 13, 2007), 4. 
11 James Cogan, “U.S. Democrat Biden Advocates the Communal Break-up of Iraq,” World 
Socialist Web Site, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2006/may2006/bide-m09.shtml (Accessed 
February 13, 2007). 
12 Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Things Fall Apart:Containing the Spillover from 
an Iraqi Civil War” (analysis paper no. 11, The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the 
Brookings Institution, January 2007), 
http://media.brookings.edu/MediaArchive/fp/jan2007iraq_civilwar.pdf (Accessed February 4, 
2007). 
13 Baker and Hamilton, “The Iraq Study Group Report,” 23. 
14 Robert Looney, “Can Iraq Overcome the Oil Curse?” World Economics 7.1, (January-
March 2006); 34.  
15 Baker and Hamilton, “The Iraq Study Group Report,” 23. 
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others, especially Johnson,16 Martin, and Subramanian,17 indicate that a direct 
distribution system could bring fair distributions for every man and woman in Iraq, 
thus limiting the insurgency problem. 
The Iraqi Constitution is also important in relation to ethnic conflicts and/or 
violence, and oil in that country. Many scholars indicate the importance of these 
issues, such as Benomar, who indicates, “the constitution and constitution-
making process represents people’s will, forges a consensus regarding the future 
of the state, and ensures respect for universal principles such as human rights 
and the basic norms of democratic governance.”18  
Finally, drafting the new oil law lies at the heart of debates about the future 
of Iraq, especially the issue of a strong central government versus strong 
regional governments or federalism. “The oil question has also inflamed ethnic 
and sectarian tensions. Sunni Arabs, who preside over areas of the country that 
apparently have little or no oil, are adamant about the equitable distribution of oil 
revenues by the central government.”19 
D. THE MAIN PROBLEMS FACING IRAQ REGARDING OIL 
Every day hundreds of innocent people are losing their lives due to 
ongoing ethnic and sectarian violence in Iraq. Moreover, Iraqis themselves are 
increasingly skeptical of the viability of the ongoing economic strategy, and  
 
                                            
16 Gordon O. Johnson, “Iraq’s Oil Revenues should Empower the People” (speech, Heritage 
Foundation, June 3, 2004). 
17 Xavier Sala-i-Martin and Arvind Subramanian, “Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: 
An Illustration from Nigeria,” National Bureau of Economic Research 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9804 (Accessed February 14, 2007). 
18 Jamal Benomar, “Constitution Making After Conflict,” Journal of Democracy 15.2, (April 
2004); 82. 
19 Edward Wong, “Iraqis Near Deal on Distribution of Oil,” The New York Times, December 
9, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/09/world/middleeast/09oil.html?ex=1323320400&en=b08df7038
436ab20&ei=5088&partner=rssn (Accessed February 4, 2007). 
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semblance of stability.20 In this chaotic environment, many people believe that 
immediate and long-term growth depends predominantly on the oil sector.21 But 
how can Iraq overcome the oil curse?22 
The United States General Accountability Office (GAO), Congress’s non-
partisan investigative agency, conducted a study in which they identified 
characteristics that are useful in examining the effectiveness of a proclaimed 
strategy. These desirable characteristics are:  
• A statement of purpose, scope, and methodology; 
• Problem definition and risk assessment; 
• Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance 
measures; 
• Resources, investments, and risk management; 
• Organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination; 
• Integration and implementation. 23 
To a varying degree, these characteristics can be used to find a solution 
for the chaotic environment in Iraq. The strategy should also be holistic in its 
approach, and define the problem(s) clearly.24 In this context, there are 
intermingled problems facing Iraq regarding the economy, particularly the oil 
economy. 
1. Difficulties in Designing an Economic Strategy for Iraq 
A major problem in designing an economic strategy for Iraq is that the 
country’s economic environment does not fit neatly into any category of the  
 
                                            
20 Looney, “Can Iraq Overcome the Oil Curse?” 23.  
21 Baker and Hamilton, “The Iraq Study Group Report,” 21. 
22 Looney, “Can Iraq Overcome the Oil Curse?”,1.  
23 Yim A. Randall, “Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National 
Strategies Related to Terrorism,” U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
www.gao.gov/cgibin/getrpt?GAO-04-408T (Accessed February 23, 2007). 
24 Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1996), 6. 
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standard development strategies. In fact, the immediate Iraqi post-war economy 
could conceivably be viewed from a number of perspectives, each encompassing 
certain aspects present today. These are:  
o Transition economy. 
o Failed state. 
o Rentier economy. 
o Post-conflict economy. 
o Failed take-off economy. 25 
2. Shadow Economy  
While Iraq’s oil has always held the prospect for future prosperity, the 
unfortunate fact is that most oil-rich developing countries are underperformers 
across a whole spectrum of economic, social, political and governance 
standards.26 In other words, the oil has brought an informal or shadow economy. 
27  
3. Ethnic Groups, Sectarian Groups, Tribes, and Extended 
Families vs. National Identity 
Iraq has a tribal society that consists of many ethnic groups, sectarian 
groups, tribes, and extended families. One can never easily divide the cities and 
the oil areas among these groups. In this turmoil, there is a big question of how 
the nation’s wealth is distributed. “This has not only opened the door for over-
ambitious, ethnically based political agendas, but also rivalry for the wealth that 
should belong to all Iraqis. It has highlighted the divisions that have existed in 
Iraq for centuries, but failed to stress at the same time the Iraqi national identity,  
 
                                            
25 Robert Looney, “Socio-Economic Strategies to Counter Extremism in Iraq,” Journal of 
South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies XXIX.2, (Winter 2006); 23.  
26 Robert Looney, “Economic Consequences of Conflict: The Rise of Iraq’s Informal 
Economy,” Journal of Economic Issues, (December 2006); 3. 
27 Robert Looney, “The Business of Insurgency: The Expansion of Iraq’s Shadow Economy,” 
RISEC 52, (December 2005); 1. 
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the only glue that can hold this society together. Without such basic assurances, 
the people are unable to see what stake they have in Iraq's future.”28 
4. Ethnic and Sectarian Violence 
The Iraq Study Group said in its December 6, 2006 report that the 
“...situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating,’ a view that appears widely shared 
by experts.” 29 President Bush, in his January 10, 2007 speech on Iraq, also said 
that the situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the American people and it is 
unacceptable to him. “Additionally, the deterioration in security is, at least partly, 
the result of growing sectarian violence—that some major news organizations 
now openly call a ‘civil war.” 30 
5. Criminal Economy and the Main Problems Due to Ethnic and 
Sectarian Violence 
Looney discusses that there is a criminal economy and the following 
problems have been occurring because of the ongoing conflict in Iraq.  
o Organized Crime, Iraqi-Style. 
o The Gasoline Scam. 
o The Kidnapping Industry. 
o The Drug Trade. 





                                            
28 Abdullah Gül, “The East's Problem is Internal, not a Clash with the West,” Financial Times, 
January 17, 2007.  
29 Kenneth Katzman, “Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security,” Congressional 
Research Service Report for Congress (CRS Order Code RL31339), February 1, 2007, 26. 
30 Katzman, “Iraq,” 26. 
31 Robert Looney, “Iraq’s Shadow Economy,” The National Interest (Fall 2005); 1. 
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6. No Dependable Census Since 1957 
“The last dependable census was conducted in 1957, and Iraqi 
government explained the result of that census in 1959.”32 Therefore, a credible 
census is needed to permit fair oil revenue distribution.  
7. Constitutional Problems 
According to many scholars, “of all the articles in the constitution those 
relating to oil have been the most contentious. The key provisions are outlined in 
Articles 111 and 112.”33 In fact, unless it is amended, the Iraqi Constitution will 
most likely play a significant role in structuring both production and revenue 
developments in the oil sector. However, it raises many questions about the fate 
of the country’s oil sector and the merits of reorganizing its national oil company 
or devolving power in the oil sector to local or regional authorities.34 
8. Kirkuk Issue 
“As all eyes are turned toward efforts to stabilize Iraq, the conflict that has 
been percolating in Kirkuk remains dangerous and dangerously neglected. That 
struggle is equal parts street brawl over oil riches, ethnic competition over identity 
between Kurdish, Turkmen, Arab and Assyrian-Chaldean communities.”35 In this 
chaotic environment, Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution says that there has to 
be a referendum until 12/31/2007. 
 
 
                                            
32 Brendan O’Leary and Khaled Salih, “The Denial, Resurrection, and Affirmation of 
Kurdistan,” in The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq, eds. Brendan O’Leary, John McGarry, and Khaled 
Salih, (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 83. 
33 Looney, “The Economic Challenge,” 16. 
34 Joe Barnes and Amy M. Jaffe, “The Persian Gulf and the Geopolitics of Oil,” Survival 48.1, 
(March 2006); 151. 
35 International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: The Brewing Battle over Kirkuk,” Middle 
East Report, no. 56, (July 18, 2006); 1. 
 10
9. Organization of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) 
ISF is based on ethnic and sectarian groups and it does not have a 
national identity. In fact, the units are based on sectarian or ethnic groups; 
however, most of the commanders of these units are not appointed from the 
same sect or ethnic group as the troops that they command. In this manner, it is 
difficult for a commander to command his troops.  
Besides the ISF, there are also ethnic and sectarian militia groups, which 
have the potential to increase the tension in Iraq. Hamid Afandi, the head of 
Peshmerga for the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), one of the two major 
Kurdish groups, said, "if we can resolve this by talking, fine, but if not, then we 
will resolve it by fighting. We have 7,000 Peshmerga in Kirkuk, as well as 3,000 
in Mosul"36    
10. Dreams of the Kurds and Possible Results of these Dreams  
Kurds have many dreams to take the biggest part of oil revenues to 
establish an independent government. In this context, as a first step, “they are 
moving systematically to increase their control of Kirkuk to guarantee annexation 
of all or most of the city and province into the “Regional Government (KRG)” after 
the constitutionally mandated referendum scheduled to occur no later than 
December 31, 2007.”37  
11. Oil Areas 
The oil map shown in Figure 1 clearly defines that oil areas cause tension 
in Iraq. The lack of oil in the predominantly Sunni Arab areas of Iraq requires 
equitable distribution of revenue to keep the nation together.  
                                            
36 Turkish Daily News, “Hamid Afandi: Kirkuk is Kurdistan,” February 14, 2005. 
37 National Intelligence Council, “Prospects for Iraq’s Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead,” 
Federation of American Scientists, (January 2007), http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/iraq020207.pdf 
(Accessed February 25, 2007). 
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Figure 1.   Oil Map of Iraq38 
 
12. Current and Possible Pipelines and Their Security Problems  
Figure 2 clearly defines that the current pipeline system has security 
problems in today’s chaotic atmosphere. Taking security measures for the 
pipelines will also likely be a problem for the future. Additionally, it will also be a 
problem in possible future pipelines. 
                                            
38 Energy Information Administration, “Iraq Oil Map,” 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/security/esar/esar_bigpic.htm (Accessed February 25, 2007). 
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Figure 2.   Pipelines in Iraq 39 
 
13. The Need for Additional Oil Refineries 
“Iraq has only three big refineries; the 310,000-bbl/d Baiji, 150,000-bbl/d 
Basra, and 110,000-bbl/d Daura plants. In order to reduce Iraq's need for oil 
product imports, significant investment will be needed to perform refinery 
                                            
39 Energy Information Administration, “Iraq Oil Pipelines,” 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iraq/Oil.html (Accessed February 25, 2007). 
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upgrades (Iraq had identified dozens of such projects prior to the 2003 Iraq war) 
and possibly to build new refineries.”40 “As well as being costly, the supply of 
imported fuels cannot be relied on. Deliveries from Syria and Jordan, which 
border on the volatile Anbar governorate, have come to a halt because of the 
instability.”41 
14. Diversification of Industries and Agriculture 
“Historically, Iraq was one of the major agricultural countries in the world. 
However, since the 1950’s, the country’s economy has been increasingly 
dominated by the oil sector.”42 
15. Results from the January and December 2005 Elections 
Before and during both of these elections, approximately 350,000 Kurds 
moved to Kirkuk from other Kurdish cities with the goal of counter-balancing the 
effects of Arabization.43 According to Kurd sources, during the Arabization period 
250,000 to 400,000 Kurds were forced to move from Kirkuk; however, this 
number according to Turkmen and Arab sources is more likely between 30,000 
and 50,000.44 Additionally, the author of this study also witnessed other Kurdish 
pre-election cheatings. 
E. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This thesis examines the oil distribution problem in Iraq as a case study. In 
particular, a number of scenarios are developed that trace the logical 
                                            
40 Energy Information Administration, “Iraq Oil Pipelines,” 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iraq/Oil.html (Accessed February 25, 2007).  
41 Shawkat al-Bayati, “Iraq Has Plenty of Oil But No Gasoline,” Environmental News Service, 
(May 12, 2005), http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/may2005/2005-05-12-03.asp (Accessed 
February 25, 2007). 
42 Looney, “Economic Consequences of Conflict,” 2. 
43 Cordesman, “Dividing Iraq,” 108. 
44 Ralph Peters, “Blood Borders How a Better Middle East Would Look,” Armed Forces 
Journal, (June 2006), http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/06/1833899 (Accessed 
September 13, 2007). 
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consequences of alternative oil-distribution systems. In this context, this study 
argues the original system outlined in the Iraqi Constitution, the reasons for 
modification of the constitution, and the ramifications and aspects of the new oil 
law. The study also discusses the federal governmental system vs. a strong 
central governmental system as it pertains to revenue sharing of oil. Additionally, 
the study examines the direct distribution system and makes recommendations 
based on the findings of the aforementioned studies. Finally, it offers a solution 
based on the information discussed in the first four chapters. 
This study draws on the sources of the above scholars, as well as others 
working in the area of Iraq, oil distribution, and governmental structures. It also 
uses explanations of related countries’ officials, predominantly people from Iraq, 
the U.S., Turkey, Iran, and other regional and global key actors. Additionally, the 
author’s personal observations and thoughts gained while serving in and related 
to Iraq in various missions are important sources for these arguments. 
In this context, Chapter II discusses implementation considerations, 
economic and other problems, and ethnic and sectarian violence regarding the 
constitution and draft oil law. Additionally, it discusses possible solutions for the 
problems mentioned above.  
Chapter III discusses a core issue, federalism vs. a strong central 
government. It especially argues the effects of the state formation and 
democracy history of Iraq, the ongoing war and promoting democracy efforts 
regarding the federalism issue and oil politics. It also discusses the relationship 
between the main problems, ethnic and sectarian violence, and federalism and 
oil politics. Additionally, this chapter identifies the key factors leading to success 
or failure. 
Chapter IV discusses the proposals on a direct distribution system — 
direct payments to the population. In this context, it talks about different 
proposals discussed by scholars. Additionally, it argues the advantages and 
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disadvantages of such a system. Ultimately, it evaluates and compares those 
advantages and disadvantages to reach a conclusion on the issue. 
Chapter V offers an approach for an ideal oil distribution scenario. 
Additionally, it discusses possible modifications of the Iraqi Constitution and new 
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II. THE ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTLINED IN THE IRAQI 
CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW HYDROCARBON/OIL LAW: 
REASONS FOR MODIFICATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
“The constitution and constitution-making process represents people’s will, 
forges a consensus regarding the future of the state, and ensures respect for 
universal principles such as human rights and the basic norms of democratic 
governance.”45 “Additionally, constitutions can play a critical role in founding and 
unifying new or renewing states: Iraq is no exception.”46 However, the situation in 
Iraq is grave and deteriorating. Though there is no path that can guarantee 
success, the prospects can be improved.47 In fact, immediate and long-term 
growth depends predominantly on the oil sector.48 However, a peculiar 
geography lies at the center of Iraq’s oil politics. Until recently, Sunni Arabs 
dominated Iraq, but most of its oil is located in other ethnic and sectarian groups’ 
regions.49 Thus, fair oil distribution has remained one of the most problematic 
and important issues for that country. In this context, the Iraqi Constitution and 
drafting the New Hydrocarbon/Oil Law lie at the heart of debates, especially to 
find or to wipe out a solution for fair distribution of oil in that country. 
In this context, this chapter discusses implementation considerations, 
economic and other problems, and ethnic and sectarian violence regarding the 
constitution and draft oil law. Additionally, it offers possible solutions for the 
problems mentioned above.  
                                            
45 Benomar, “Constitution Making,”82. 
46 Robert Looney, “Economic Consequences of the New Iraqi Constitution,” Gulf Yearbook 
(2005-2006); 365. 
47 Baker and Hamilton, “The Iraq Study Group Report,” 6. 
48 Ibid., 21. 
49 Nikos E. Tsafos, “Geography and Oil Politics in Iraq” SAIS Review 26.1, (2006): 63. 
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B. IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS: MAIN PROBLEMS 
Most people believe that near and long-term growth in the chaotic 
environment of Iraq depends predominantly on the oil sector.50 But how can Iraq 
overcome the oil curse?51 The Iraqi Constitution and the New Hydrocarbon/Oil 
Law should have been the first steps to overcome such thorny problems. 
However, there are many intermingled problems facing Iraq, which cause an 
increase in violence in that country, and which stem from the constitution and the 
new oil law. 
Many scholars believe that perhaps of all the articles in the constitution, 
those relating to oil have been the most contentious.52 In fact, unless it is 
amended, the Iraqi Constitution will likely play a significant role in structuring both 
production and revenue developments in the oil sector. However, it raises many 
questions about the fate of the country’s oil sector and the merits of reorganizing 
its national oil company or devolving power in the oil sector to local regional 
authorities.53 In this context, it can be said that the key provisions on oil are 
outlined in Articles 111 and 112 of the constitution; yet, there are many other 
problematic areas in other articles.  
C. ARTICLES 111 AND 112 OF IRAQI CONSTITUTION  
1. Article 111 
“Oil and gas are owned by all the people of Iraq in all the regions and 
governorates.” 54 
 
                                            
50 Baker and Hamilton, “The Iraq Study Group Report,” 21. 
51 Looney, “Economic Consequences of the New Iraqi Constitution,” 365. 
52 Ibid., 370. 
53 Barnes and Jaffe, “The Persian Gulf,” 151. 
54 Export.gov, “Iraqi Constitution,” (2005), 
http://www.export.gov/iraq/pdf/iraqi_constitution.pdf (Accessed July 15, 2007). 
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2. Article 112  
a. First  
The federal government, with the producing governorates and 
regional governments, shall undertake the management of oil and 
gas extracted from present fields, provided that it distributes its 
revenues in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution 
in all parts of the country, specifying an allotment for a specified 
period for the damaged regions which were unjustly deprived of 
them by the former regime, and the regions that were damaged 
afterwards in a way that ensures balanced development in different 
areas of the country, and this shall be regulated by a law.55 
b. Second  
The federal government, with the producing regional and 
governorate governments, shall together formulate the necessary 
strategic policies to develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that 
achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people using the most 
advanced techniques of the market principles and encouraging 
investment. 56 
The two articles mentioned above have problematic areas, especially for 
the Sunni Arab people of Iraq. In fact, they are not equal recipients of the oil 
revenue. The wording of Article 112 hints that an exploration and development 
strategy will be undertaken in partnership with the region.57 “In this context, the 
Kurds are allowed to form a single supra-region in the oil-rich north; the Shi’a 
Arabs to form theirs in the oil-reach area in the south, while the Sunni Arabs are 
left in the oil-dry center.”58 Additionally, with the help of the Iraqi Constitution, 
Turkmens and Christian minorities also fear that the Kurds and the Shi’a Arabs 
will create their super-region and exclude them from the profits. 
                                            
55 Export.gov, “Iraqi Constitution.” 
56 Ibid. 
57 Oxford Analytica, “Iraq Draft Constitution Has Strong Federal Theme,” August 30, 2005.  
58 Fred Kaplan, “Articles of Consternation: Iraq’s Infuriatingly Vague Constitution,” Slate, 
(August 23, 2005) http://www.slate.com/id/2124893/ (Accessed July 5, 2007). 
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On the other hand, Article 112 refers only to revenue from current oil and 
gas fields; it does not refer to the vast untapped wells. In this context, Sunni 
Arabs fear that they will see little revenue derived from new wells brought on line 
in the future.59 Additionally, “as the constitution stands, the regional states are 
delegated authority over all new fields and therefore control over the negotiation 
of exploration contacts and the bulk of revenues derived from future 
production.”60 In this context, the Kurds have made agreements with foreign 
companies independent of the Iraqi Oil Ministry.61  
The situation mentioned above shows that the Iraqi Constitution, as 
currently worded, could allow several autonomous zones in which the central 
government in Baghdad would not have complete control over oil resources. 
Such an interpretation would likely lead to more chaos and more violence. “Since 
the constitution’s treatment of the ownership and distribution of oil resources and 
revenues has the potential in the context of a federalist state organization to 
contribute to the country’s economic instability.” 62 
In summary, Articles 111 and 112 appear to satisfy Kurdish and Shi’a 
Arab concerns and needs at the expense of the others. “Furthermore, the 
constitution leaves open the possibility of abuse of economic power by the Kurds 
and Shi’a Arabs. Additionally, the constitutions’ lack of clarity on many oil issues 
such as production and distribution are also conducive to an atmosphere of 




                                            
59 Looney, “Economic Consequences of the New Iraqi Constitution,” 371. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Voice of America, “Kürtler Petrol Konusunda Direniyor,” (December 5, 2005) 
http://www.voanews.com/turkish/archive/2005-12/2005-12-05-voa5.cfm (Accessed July 5, 2007). 
62 Looney, “Economic Consequences of the New Iraqi Constitution,” 373. 
63 Ibid., 374. 
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D. THE KIRKUK ISSUE  
1. Violence Increases Despite the New Hydrocarbon/Oil Law 
The Iraqi government made some progress towards political conciliation 
and reducing the causes of sectarian and ethnic tension in early 2007. In this 
context, the Iraqi cabinet approved the New Hydrocarbon/Oil Law in late 
February 2007. The oil minister, Hussein Shahristani, promised that oil and gas 
resources would be "the property of the Iraqi people'' and that revenues would be 
distributed equally among the regions.64 “‘The exploitation of Iraq's fields will be 
decided by a process of open bidding, based on model contracts,’ Mr. 
Shahristani said. ‘The process will be transparent and open.’''65 However, this 
progress was far more conceptual than a matter of creating new facts on the 
ground. Key issues like Kirkuk remained unresolved.66  
The Kirkuk issue is one of the most complicated and important issues 
challenging fair oil distribution in advancing. However, violence increases day 
after day in or around the city. In the first half of July 2007, 250 people were killed 
and approximately 500 people were seriously wounded in or around the city of 
Kirkuk.67 This latest wave of deadly attacks to hit the oil-rich, ethnically-
combustible city of Kirkuk appears to be a prelude of worse things to come, with 
a referendum to decide its status looming by the end of 2007.68 In this context, it  
 
 
                                            
64 The Daily Telegraph, “Iraq Prepares to Allow Foreign Firms to Exploit its Oil and Gas 
Riches,” (February 27, 2007) http://www.noozz.com/Iraq/PrinterVersion.aspx?ArticleId=206438 
(Accessed July 7, 2007). 
65 Ibid. 
66 Anthony H. Cordesman, “Iraq’s Sectarian and Ethnic Violence and the Evolving 
Insurgency: Developments through Spring 2007,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
(May 2, 2007). 
67 CNN Turk, “Kerkük'te Bombalı Saldırılar: 85 Ölü,” (July 16, 2006) 
http://www.cnnturk.com/haber/haber_detay.asp?PID=00319&haberID=377069 (Accessed July 
17, 2007). 
68 Assyrian International News Agency, “The Temperature Rises in Kirkuk,” May 26, 2007. 
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is important to find the answers for the following questions: Will the tension and 
violence decline or increase? Why is there so much tension in or around Kirkuk? 
What are the effects of this tension? 
2. The Same Perspective from Different Reports 
The International Crisis Group (ICG), who is working to prevent conflict 
worldwide, published a report on July 18, 2006 about the tensions in Kirkuk, Iraq. 
According to the ICG report, “as all eyes are turned toward efforts to stabilize 
Iraq, the conflict that has been percolating in Kirkuk remains dangerous and 
dangerously neglected. That struggle is equal parts street brawl over oil riches, 
ethnic competition over identity between Kurdish, Turkmen, Arab and Assyrian-
Chaldean communities.”69   
On the other hand, in January 2007, the National Intelligence Estimate on 
Iraq described the complex patterns of violence in and around Kirkuk. “The Kurds 
are moving systematically to increase their control of Kirkuk to guarantee 
annexation of all or most of the city and province into the “Regional Government 
(KRG)” after the constitutionally mandated referendum scheduled to occur no 
later than December 31, 2007. Arab groups in Kirkuk continue to resist violently 
what they see as Kurdish encroachment.”70 
The Pentagon also mentions that sectarian violence is gradually 
expanding north to Kirkuk and Diyala provinces.71 Additionally, the Baghdad 
Coroner’s Office reported that hundreds of people were killed in or around Kirkuk, 
and the deceased predominantly consisted of the important persons of the tribes, 
ethnic groups, and religious sects.72 
                                            
69 International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds.” 
70 National Intelligence Council, “Prospects for Iraq’s Stability.” 
71 U.S. Department of Defense, Quarterly Report to Congress: Measuring Stability and 
Security in Iraq, March 2007, 5. 
72 Sabah Gazetesi, “ASAM Irak Raporu,” September 12, 2006. 
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Different reports mentioned above indicate that tension and violence is 
increasing in and around Kirkuk. In this context, it is important to understand the 
reasons and the affects of increasing tension and violence. This issue should be 
analyzed in an historical context for a better understanding. 
3. Historical Events Related with Kirkuk from World War I to the 
U.S. Invasion 
Kirkuk has always been very important in the Ottoman and modern Iraq’s 
history, but the biggest problems began after World War I. The discovery of vast 
quantities of oil in the region after World War I provided the impetus for the 
annexation of the former Ottoman Wilayah of Mosul (of which the Kirkuk region 
was a part) to the Iraqi Kingdom, which was established in 1921.73 During the 
Conference of Lausanne, in order to write a new treaty with Turkey after the 
Turkish War of Independence, Mosul and Kirkuk were not given to any party. 
Thus, the issue remained a problem that was to be solved at a later date by the 
League of Nations. Then, Kirkuk was given to Iraq under the mandate of Great 
Britain in 1926 in accordance with the resolution of the League of Nations. 
In 1927, a large oil gusher was discovered at Baba Gurgur near Kirkuk, 
which greatly increased the importance of the city and its environs. “Then Prime 
Minister Nuri Said declared the independence of Iraq in 1932 by addressing the 
primary components of the new state as Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmens. However, 
after General Qasim came to power in 1958, the interim constitution changed the 
situation.”74 In that constitution, Arabs and Kurds were defined as the owners of 




                                            
73 David Fromkin, A Peace to End all Peace; Creating the Modern Middle East, 1914-1922 
(Epsilon Publishing Inc., 2004), 21.  
74 Peter W. Galbraith, How American Incompetence Created a War Without End” (Simon & 
Schuster Publishing, Inc., 2006), 138. 
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revoked. “Immediately following the constitution, the Baathists commenced the 
ethnic violence by killing thirty Turkmen, with an idea of Arabization, in Kirkuk in 
1959.”75 
The actual Arabization Movement, a violent campaign and an attempt to 
transform the historically multi-ethnic city of Kirkuk into an Arab city, began in 
1961, and many thousands of Kurds and Turkmens were exiled. “Immediately 
afterwards, Mullah Mustafa Barzani explained that Kurds desired Kirkuk from 
1923, and he declared the foundation of the Peshmerga, or armed Kurdish 
fighters.”76 Arabization continued up until the U.S. invasion in 2003. According to 
the Human Rights Watch, from the 1991 Gulf War until 2003, the former Iraqi 
government systematically expelled an estimated 120,000 Kurds, Turkmens, and 
Assyrians from Kirkuk and other towns and villages in this oil-rich region.77 
Meanwhile, the Iraqi government resettled Arab families in their place in an 
attempt to reduce the political power and presence of ethnic minorities.78 
On the other hand, even within the Kurdish dominated regions, internal 
politics made settling the Kirkuk issue more difficult during the 1990s. The two 
main Kurdish fractions, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan (PUK), were locked in a political rivalry that gave way to a civil 
war. Hostilities culminated between these two Kurdish entities in 1988.79 This 
conflict led to the establishment of the Peace Monitoring Force (PMF). The PMF 
was established by the United Nations in order to separate KDP and PUK 
combat units in 1996.  
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78 Ibid. 
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4. Events after the U.S. Invasion 
After the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Peshmerga quickly took control of 
Kirkuk and plundered the Kirkuk Census Bureau.80 “After Turkey expressed 
alarm at the possibility of Kurdish control of the Kirkuk oil fields (and the resulting 
wealth), the Kurdish militia withdrew to barracks outside the city. However, 
Kurdish militias have remained a presence in and around the city since that time. 
Additionally, the Kurdish militias have also systematically infiltrated the Iraqi Army 
units in the north of Iraq.”81  
The Kurds are also prepared to fight in order to gain control of the city. 
"Kirkuk is Kurdistan; it does not belong to the Arabs," Hamid Afandi, the head of 
Peshmerga for the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), one of the two major 
Kurdish groups, said.82 "If we can resolve this by talking, fine, but if not, then we 
will resolve it by fighting. We have 7,000 Peshmerga in Kirkuk, as well as 3,000 
in Mosul"83   Mesut Barzani, leader of the KDP, also stated that he would die 
before he ever relinquished Kirkuk. However, the Arabs, both Shi’a and Sunni, 
are also not prepared to surrender control of Kirkuk to the Kurds without a fight. 
“In a meeting in Kirkuk in July 2006, Muqtada al Sadr’s representative in the city, 
Abdul Karim Khalifa, told U.S. officials that more armed loyalists were on the way 
and that as many as 7,000 to 10,000 Shi’a Arab residents were prepared to fight 
alongside the Mahdi Army if called upon.”84 He also stated that legions to assist 
the Shi’a Arab militiamen would push north from Baghdad’s Sadr City slum.85 
                                            
80 BBC News, “Kurds Occupy Oil City Kirkuk,” 
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In addition, Kurdish migration to Kirkuk greatly increased ethnic tensions 
during the January and December 2005 elections. Before and during both 
election periods, approximately 350,000 Kurds moved to Kirkuk from other 
Kurdish cities with the goal of undoing the effects of Arabization.86  According to 
Kurdish sources, during the Arabization period, 250,000 to 400,000 Kurds were 
forced to move from Kirkuk. However, according to Turkmen and Arab sources, 
this number is more likely between 30,000 and 50,000.87 The Election 
Committee leader for the region, Yahiya Assi Al-Haddidi, resigned due to his 
allegations of Kurdish pre-election cheating.88 
On the other hand, in September 2002, the KDP and the PUK agreed to 
draft a constitution for a post-Saddam Iraq that would include a federal Kurdish 
region with Kirkuk as its capital.89 After this event, “Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit 
made it clear that the formation of an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, 
and the Kurdish occupation of the oil-rich territory of Kirkuk — at the time under 
Baghdad’s jurisdiction — would lead to war with Turkey.”90 Moreover, Turkish 
Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül addressed that attempts to change the 
demographic character of Kirkuk would lead to war with Turkey, after Kurds 
plundered the Kirkuk Census Bureau in April 2003.91 He also pointed out the 
attempts to ignore the existence of Iraqi Turkmens. He said that the last 
dependable census was conducted in 1957, and ‘the Iraqi Revolution 14th July 
Celebrations Committee’ explained the result of that census in 1959.92 According 
                                            
86 Cordesman, “Iraq’s Sectarian and Ethnic Violence,” 108. 
87 Peters, “Blood Borders.” 
88 Özüm Uzun and Duygu Dersan, “Irak Seçimleri Analizi,” Global Strateji Enstitüsü, 
http://www.globalstrateji.org/TUR/Icerik_Detay.ASP?Icerik=313 (Accessed August 17, 2007). 
89 Fawn and Hinnebusch, The Iraq War, 198. 
90 Ibid. 
91 GlobalSecurity.org, “Kirkuk,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iraq/kirkuk.htm 
(Accessed June 17, 2007). 
92 Ibid. 
 27
to the results, Turkmens made up 40% of the population of Kirkuk, Kurds 
composed 35%, Arabs 24%, and Christians 1%.93 
There are also other important developments in Kirkuk during this time 
period. Kurdish officials began offering Arabs incentives to forfeit voting rights for 
the referendum. Arabs would receive $19,000 if they moved from their homes 
and gave up their voting rights.94 Furthermore, in late March 2007, the central 
Iraqi cabinet approved a decision to pay Arab families $15,000 each to leave 
Kirkuk.95 The offer would be extended to Arab families that had been forced to 
move to Kirkuk during Saddam Hussein’s Arabization campaign; they would be 
given a piece of land in their original towns. Despite deteriorating economic 
conditions, however, it was unlikely that many Arab families would voluntarily 
relocate, effectively giving Kirkuk to “Kurdistan.”96 
5. The Situation Today 
In short, there are four major ethnic and sectarian groups in Kirkuk: the 
Shi’a Arabs, Sunni Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmens, all of whom have a claim and 
desire to control all or some of the regional oil reserves. Kirkuk is a city of 
incredible ethnic tensions. The destiny of Kirkuk, which has almost fourteen 
billion barrels of proven oil reserves, and in 1989 —when Iraq’s revenues were 
twelve billion dollars at their high — acquired 70% of the annual revenues,97 
depends on the articles of the Iraqi Constitution. In this context, one should 
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understand that Articles 112 and 140 of the Iraqi Constitution are very important 
in relation to ethnic conflicts and/or violence, and oil in or around Kirkuk.  
a. Article 112 
Article 112, as discussed above, appears to satisfy Kurdish and 
Shi’a Arab concerns and needs, but not that of others. In this manner, there is no 
exception about the Kirkuk issue. 
b. Article 14098 
(1)  First: The executive authority shall undertake the 
necessary steps to complete the implementation of the requirements of all 
subparagraphs of Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law. 
(2)  Second: The responsibility placed upon the executive 
branch of the Iraqi Transitional Government, stipulated in Article 58 of the 
Transitional Administrative Law, shall extend and continue to the executive 
authority elected in accordance with this constitution. This is provided that it is 
completely accomplished (in normalization and census, and concludes with a 
referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine the will of their 
citizens) by a date not to exceed the December 31, 2007. 
With this history as a background, it is clear that a 
referendum will likely cause more problems and violence in and around Kirkuk. In 
this context, it can be said that as predicted by a number of authors from a wide 
spectrum of countries — especially the U.S., England and Turkey — the battle 
for Kirkuk will likely begin when the referendum in this chaotic environment is 
conducted or the American military begins its inevitable withdrawal.  
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6. Assessment 
If aggressive steps are not taken now, there will likely be a civil war for 
control of Kirkuk and its oil wealth. Complicating this is the Kurds’ desire for an 
“independent and broader Kurdistan,” an event likely to provoke Turkey, Syria, 
and Iran. The Kurds consider Kirkuk to be the capital of “a greater Kurdistan” 
spanning from Turkey to Iran and Syria as mentioned by Mesut Barzani, the KDP 
leader.99 In this context, it is possible that the Kurds want to merge 
Suleymaniyah with Kirkuk, and Irbil with Mosul to create “two new broader 
Kurdish dominated provinces." Additionally, Kurds would also like to take control 
of these new formations under the authority of the “KRG.” The Kurds most likely 
have a plan to repel a Shi’a Arab and Sunni Arab intervention due to revenues of 
oil if they can create the new provinces. In the worst case scenario, the Kurds will 
likely think that they will use their Peshmerga, a 200,000-strong militia, of which 
40,000 are ready under the control of the “KRG,” and 20,000 of which are under 
the authority of the Central Iraqi Government, in case of a civil war. 
In this context, the situation may cause for independent Kurdish and Shi’a 
Arab governments, which affects the key regional and global actors’ economic 
and political interests. The situation also affects the long-term policies of regional 
and global key actors due to the proven and potential oil reserves, the oil 
transportation methods, and domestic issues as well.  
In summary, the strategic importance of Kirkuk, if not resolved peacefully, 
will result in tremendous instability and violence, and the impact would be felt 
globally. Sixty-five percent of the world’s oil reserves are in the Middle East, and 
one-tenth of that oil is in or around Kirkuk itself. This wealth must be used for the 
benefit of Iraq instead of the benefit of any ethnic group. If a consensus is 
reached on the disposition of Kirkuk, it should bring stability and peace to the 
region and to the world. 
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E. OTHER ISSUES THREATENING THE STABILITY OF IRAQ AND THE 
REGION 
The Iraqi Constitution has the potential to further damage the country’s oil 
politics and fragile efforts to stop violence. In fact, many articles of the 
constitution actually increase tension and violence, which threaten the fair oil 
revenue distribution in that country.  
1. Article 2100 
a. First  
Islam is the official religion of the state and is a foundation source 
of legislation: 
• No law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions 
of Islam. 
• No law may be enacted that contradicts the principles of 
democracy. 
• No law may be enacted that contradicts the rights and basic 
freedoms stipulated in this constitution. 
b. Second  
This constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the majority of 
the Iraqi people and guarantees the full religious rights to freedom of religious 
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2. Article 4101 
a. First  
The Arabic language and the Kurdish language are the two official 
languages of Iraq. The right of Iraqis to educate their children in their mother 
tongue, such as Turkmen, Syriac, and Armenian, shall be guaranteed in 
government educational institutions in accordance with educational guidelines, or 
in any other language in private educational institutions. 
b. Second  
The scope of the term “official language” and the means of applying 
the provisions of this article shall be defined by a law and shall include: 
• Publication of the Official Gazette in the two languages; 
• Speech, conversation, and expression in official domains, such as 
the Council of Representatives, the Council of Ministers, courts, 
and official conferences in either of the two languages; 
• Recognition and publication of official documents and 
correspondence in the two languages; 
• Opening schools that teach the two languages in accordance with 
the educational guidelines; 
• Use of both languages in any matter enjoined by the principle of 
equality, such as bank notes, passports, and stamps. 
c. Third  
The federal and official institutions and agencies in the “Kurdistan 
region” shall use both languages. 
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d. Fourth  
The Turkmen language and the Syriac language are two other 
official languages in the administrative units in which they constitute density of 
population. 
e. Fifth  
Each region or governorate may adopt any other local language as 
an additional official language if the majority of its population so decides in a 
general referendum. 
3. Article 7102 
a. First  
Any entity or program that adopts, incites, facilitates, glorifies, 
promotes, or justifies racism or terrorism, or accusations of being an infidel 
(takfir) or ethnic cleansing, especially the Saddamist Ba’ath in Iraq and its 
symbols, under any name whatsoever, shall be prohibited. Such entities may not 
be part of political pluralism in Iraq. This shall be regulated by law. 
b. Second  
The state shall undertake the combat of terrorism in all its forms, 
and shall work to protect its territories from being a base, pathway, or field for 
terrorist activities. Article 2 states that “Islam is the official religion of the state 
and is a foundation source of legislation.”103 However, there are Christian and 
Jewish minorities in that country. 
The three articles mentioned above are critically important 
regarding the ethnic and sectarian or ethnosecterian violence. Article 2 states 
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that Islam is the official religion of the state and is a foundation source of 
legislation. This is dangerous enough to increase the violence in that country; 
however, the second part of Article 2 guarantees the full religious rights to 
freedom of religious belief and practice of all individuals such as Christians, 
Yazidis, and Mandean Sabeans. Additionally, Article 4 states that there is more 
than one official language; however, all of the Iraqi people know Arabic.  
Article 2 and Article 4 cannot permit the collaboration of ethnic and 
sectarian groups to turn into unification due to serious problems discussed in the 
first chapter of this study. Even in this atmosphere, ethnic and sectarian groups 
need each other. In this context, secularism and democracy can play a role as 
thick as cement; however, Bellin indicates that five factors, which are not found in 
Iraq, are needed for a strong democracy: a level of economic development, 
ethnic homogeneity, strength of state institutions, a historical experience, and 
elite leadership.104 This foundation can be used for the integration of different 
groups. If this base cannot be used well enough, Shi’a Arabs, Sunni Arabs, 
Christians, Jews, and others cannot live together; many different ethnic groups in 
that country cannot cohabitate; the people who speak different languages cannot 
reside together; and elusive peace cannot be reached due to many different 
political groups and economic differences. 
On the other hand, the lack of Bellin’s five factors needed for 
democracy demonstrates the inability to develop a nation state, and thus may 
necessitate the Iraqi creation of a constitutional nation. Nationalism, if properly 
created and fostered, could be the foundation for that nation. 
Article 7 also has the potential to increase violence in Iraq since it 
prohibits terrorism without actually defining terrorism. Additionally, there is no 
global definition for terrorism. It is very clear that some people or groups are 
labeled as terrorists, while the same people are freedom fighters to others. Thus, 
a threat should be evaluated globally, and the international community should 
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reach a consensus on this issue. In addition, rhetoric and terms are very 
important entities in the solution. Many people from many different countries, 
including officials and scholars, use the word “Islamists” to define terrorists. 
Neither Islam nor other religions are the source of terror. Wrong traditions, 
misperceptions, and misuse of religions may be the reasons for terror. Thus, 
Islam or any word for Islam, and other religions and the holy words of those 
religions must not be used to define terror or to describe the source of terror. 
F. ASSESSMENT 
Sixty-five percent of the world’s oil is in the Middle East. This oil is the 
lowest cost oil in the world, and the entire world needs this oil. However, violence 
in Iraq threatens the political stability of the region and the politics of oil. In this 
context, constitutional problems discussed in this chapter are at the center of the 
problem.  
Therefore, there should be an effort to find a reasonable compromise by 
holding meetings, such as those conducted in Baghdad and Sharma al-Sheikh, 
or direct talks among the representatives of all ethnic groups, as well as of the 
governments of Iraq, its neighbors, the U.S., and the other regional and global 
key actors. Otherwise, there will likely be violent communal conflict, the 
spreading of civil war, and more extremism and polarization. Moreover, the 
combination of the extremism and polarization, and early withdrawal of U.S. 
forces from Iraq, may lead to a larger, regional war in the Middle East.  
In summary, first several actions on several issues are required to 
decrease the violence in Iraq and to allow for fair oil distribution. First, 
constitutional amendments, as described in Article 142, to give additional rights 
to the other ethnic and sectarian groups — besides Shi’a Arabs and Kurds — 
can decrease the tension. These amendments should be made, especially on 
Articles 111 and 112 since they appear to satisfy Kurdish and Shi’a Arab 
concerns and needs, but not those of others. “Furthermore, the constitution 
leaves open the possibility of abuse of economic power by the Kurds and Shi’a 
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Arabs. Additionally, the constitutions’ lack of clarity on many oil issues such as 
production and distribution are also conducive to an atmosphere of corruption 
and the creation of failed rentier state.”105 
Second, the key issues for compromise on the Kirkuk issue can be found 
in a fair solution for the resettlement problem, conducting a fair census monitored 
by international observers, sharing the oil revenues of Kirkuk and other parts of 
Iraq fairly, and delaying the Kirkuk referendum for a certain period. This is 
because the strategic importance of an area, if not recognized, will result in 
tremendous instability and violence, and the impact could be felt globally. The 
wealth must be used for the benefit of the whole country, as well as the entire 
world, instead of only for the benefit of one ethnic or sectarian group. In addition, 
the problem should be resolved with a consensus to bring stability and peace to 
the region and to the world.  
Third, as discussed above, other amendments, specifically in Articles 2, 4, 
and 7, are needed to bring about secularism, a better democracy, and Iraqi 
national identity for that country. Otherwise, there will be more extremism and 
less democracy in Iraq and in the rest of the region as well. 
Fourth, the New Hydrocarbon/Oil Law should be discussed thoroughly and 
should offer equal rights to all Iraqi citizens, instead of just to the regions. Since, 
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III. WHICH FORM OF GOVERNMENT IS BETTER FOR IRAQ: A 
STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OR A FEDERAL SYSTEM? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Academics, Iraqi leaders and government officials, U.S. planners and 
military minds, as well as regional and global key countries all have different 
approaches to the oil issue. The main debates are centered on which type of 
government that is better for Iraq: a strong central government or a federal 
system. However, it is referred to as a “single federal state” in the new 
constitution. 
There are different approaches among the various Iraqi interest groups. 
“Senior members of Iraq’s oil industry argue that a national oil company could 
reduce political tensions by centralizing revenues and reducing regional or local 
claims to a percentage of the revenue derived from production.”106 However, 
some of the ethnic and sectarian groups’ leaders are suspicious and resist this 
proposal. They affirm the rights of local communities to have direct access to the 
inflow of oil revenue.107 “Kurdish leaders have been particularly aggressive in 
asserting independent control of the oil assets, signing and implementing 
investment deals with foreign oil companies in northern Iraq. Shi’a Arabs are also 
reported to be negotiating oil investment contracts with foreign companies.”108 
Moreover, Sunni Arabs do not like the idea of federalism, and the two major Shi’a 
Arab leaders, Al-Hakim and As-Sadr, have differed from one other on the key 
issues of federalism and oil distribution.109 
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There is also diversification between the U.S. and regional countries. The 
U.S. Department of Defense defines the type of government clearly in its 
proposed timetable to Congress, “such a timetable could lead to changes in the 
political dynamic in Iraq, providing support for the government’s own long-term 
vision: a united, federal, and democratic country, at peace with its neighbors and 
itself.”110 
Turkey has a different policy than the U.S. “Since 1991, Turkish 
governments had pursued a policy that aimed to preserve the territorial integrity 
and unity of Iraq.”111 Abdullah Gül, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Republic of Turkey, explained Turkey’s policy as the following idea, “it 
is up to the Iraqi people, of course, but what we want to see, that is one Iraq, 
Iraq’s territorial integrity and political unity should be preserved. Otherwise, while 
we think that the dark days are close, they will start over there. We think that the 
Iraqis will allow their countries to be separated. Well, I mean, within Iraq, there 
would be another war. So therefore, we have to encourage them to be all 
together, the Iraqis, their country. They will share their wealth. All of it is for them, 
and it is enough for all of them. But, it is up to them.”112 
Iran’s policy is not as clear as that of Turkey. Iran's Defense Minister, 
Brigadier General Mostafa-Mohammad Najjar, explained that since the very 
beginning of Iraq's crisis, the Islamic Republic of Iran has made optimum efforts 
to empower the popular government of Iraq and help with the establishment of 
peace, tranquility and stability in that country.113 However, many experts, 
including Joost Hiltermann, the Middle East program director of the International 
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Crisis Group, say that Iran supports Shi’a Arabs and desires federalism within 
Iraq. “Tehran wants to establish good relations with its one-time enemy, keep the 
government in Baghdad weak, and prevent a Saddam-like strongman from 
seizing power.”114 
Scholars are also divided on the issue. Some scholars argue that 
partitioning or federalism is a historical reality and should not be seen as a 
problem. “Historical Iraq was a place of three semi-independent parts — the 
Kurdish north, the Sunni Arab center, and the Shi’a Arab south — within the 
loose framework of the Ottoman Empire. It is the centralized Iraq, starting with 
Britain’s creation of the modern state in 1921-1923 and reaching its nadir in 
nearly three decades of Saddam’s dictatorship, which has failed and should be 
allowed to die.”115 Additionally, Kamp, O'Hanlon and Unikewicz argue that 
federalism is necessary due to the current situation.116 On the other hand, some 
other scholars, namely Cordesman117 and Cogan,118 indicate possible results of 
the partition, especially the effects of increasing violence. “A strategy of dividing 
Iraq, however, is virtually certain to make things worse, not better, and confront 
the U.S. with massive new problems in an area with some 60% of the world’s 
proven oil reserves and 37% of its gas. Even if one ignores the fact that the US 
effectively broke Iraq, and its responsibilities to some twenty-eight million Iraqis, 
a violent power vacuum in an already dangerous region is not a strategy, it is 
simply an abdication of both moral responsibility and the national interest.”119  
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Byman and Pollack also recommend that the U.S. government avoid active 
support for the partition of Iraq, at least for now, due to eruption of a full-scale 
civil war.120 
Literature reviewed above shows that the one core issue of sharing the 
country’s oil revenues is federalism. However, there are many intermingled 
problems related with the issue. At this point, as the Iraqi Study Group (ISG) 
report confirms, “there is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq.”121 “As 
such, the questions that now remain for the country and its neighbors are 
whether Iraq can survive as a unified entity or if it will descend into further chaos 
and eventually cease to exit as different groups, Kurds, Shi’a Arab and Sunni 
Arab, form their own separate nation states. The consequences, as the ISG 
group lays out, “could be severe. A slide toward chaos could trigger the collapse 
of Iraq’s government and a humanitarian catastrophe.”122 
In this context, this chapter discusses this core issue in many ways. 
Specifically, it discusses the state formation and democratic history, ongoing war 
and promoting democracy efforts, main problems, and ethnic and sectarian 
violence regarding the federalism issue and oil politics. Additionally, this chapter 
identifies the key factors leading to success or failure. 
B. STATE FORMATION OF IRAQ: HEGEMONIC RULERS AND THE LACK 
OF DEMOCRACY EXPERIENCE 
It is important to discuss the history of the state formation and democracy 
in Iraq. Many of the economic problems and violence facing Iraq today that are 
affecting oil politics stem from the state formation and lack of democracy 
experience. Additionally, a detailed study on those issues may help to solve 
existing problems, including how to share the oil revenues fairly.  
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Iraq is a revolutionary state and a successor of the Ottoman Empire. 
Additionally, it experienced decades of European rule during the twentieth 
century.123 Despite the European influence, the state formation is quite different 
from Europe. The social groups that constitute the state, the institutions, and the 
oil have influenced this dissimilarity and the state formation of that country. On 
the other hand, the reverse situation is also correct — the state formation has 
affected the social groups and the institutions in Iraq.  
Military coups and/or revolutions are also important events in Iraq’s history 
in this century, namely the Iraqi revolutions of 1920 and 1958. Some Arab, 
Western, or Soviet scholars viewed its armed forces as a modernizing 
instrument, and a major agent for change, especially because the initiators of 
these coups came from a rural area.124  Specifically, the Ba’athist intervention 
created a state controlled economy, strong industrialization, secularism, and 
political participation. It also developed an important legislative and institutional 
apparatus both at the local and national levels, especially in the initial years.125 
However, the revolutionists mostly came from rural areas and had little 
understanding of the economy, used the salaried middle-class who was close to 
them, and then new main urban beneficiaries were created.126 “They also 
created landlords, and strong tribes, in relation to their roots.”127 “In the early 
years after the intervention, the rulers declared to create more participatory state, 
but after that, they attempted to limit the participation, and described as a 
process of ‘controlled democracy’.”128 Thus, the single party (Ba’ath) system 
occurred in Iraq.   
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Personal ties also effected state formation and institutions. “Many 
researchers have demonstrated that personal ties and political patronage are 
important in the politics and administration of Iraq.”129 It is clear that the rural 
elites of the revolutionary state created a bureaucratic state without powerful 
domestic competitors, and they used personal ties as a repression and 
patronage tool of this bureaucracy. 
The ethnic, sectarian, regional, and tribal differences also have had effects 
on the state formation and institutions of Iraq. Indeed, the variety of the people 
created discrimination among the groups in the oil-rich country. Moreover, this 
discrimination made the ruling families and their ethnic groups the clear winners, 
and strengthened their positions.130  
  Arab Nationalism with Western effects and Arab-Israeli Wars are also 
related to the structural changes in one way or another, especially with the 
politics and economy of Iraq. “The Arabs had been roused from centuries of 
political lethargy, first by American teachers and missionaries, then by the 
revolution of the Young Turks, and finally by the blandishments of Europeans 
during World War I.”131 “In fact, from the West they learned about riots, freedom, 
and national self-determination.”132 In those conditions, instead of coming 
together the Arabs found themselves being pulled farther apart. However, for the 
Arab-Israeli Wars, some but not all of them came together for a short duration.  
Finally, there are many problems stemming from the state formation and 
institutions as well. There are also ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and family 
discriminations and conflicts, which cause violence and may lead to additional 
violence in the future. In addition, hegemonic rulers did not use democratic rules 
to bring people together in means of improved governance, political participation, 
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pluralism, human rights, political reforms, and regional security by their own 
dynamics. That is to say, they must realize a form of democracy that needs to be 
followed by the new rulers. In this context, the process of democratic transition 
and the necessities for a consolidated and strong democracy in that country are 
important. At this point, one should know the necessities of a consolidated and 
strong democracy as a first step. 
Robert Dahl offers the most generally accepted definition of what he terms 
the “procedural minimal” conditions that must be present for a modern political 
democracy to exist.133 These conditions are necessary for a starting point for 
differentiating between strong or consolidated democracies and weak or highly 
restricted democracies.134 The conditions are as follows:  
• Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally 
vested in officials elected by citizens.  
• Elected officials are chosen in frequent and conducted elections in 
which coercion is comparatively uncommon. 
• Citizens have a right to express themselves without danger of 
severe punishment on political matters broadly defined. 
• Citizens have a right to seek out alternative and independent 
sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information 
exist and are protected by law.  
• Citizens also have the right to form relatively independent 
associations or organizations, including independent political 
parties and interest groups. 
• Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices. 135  
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On the other hand, Bellin indicates that five factors are needed for a 
strong democracy:  
• Level of economic development, 
• Ethnic homogeneity, 
• Strength of state institutions, 
• Historical experience, and 
• Elite leadership.136 
With the help of the definitions mentioned above, many scholars examine 
the democratic transition around the world over the past half century historically 
and comparatively. In this context, Liz and Stepan look at the Balkans, Eastern 
Europe, and Latin America, while Bellin looks at Japan, Germany, Haiti, and 
Bosnia by comparing them to Iraq. In addition, Bellin, Brancati, Benomar, and 
Berman examine the democratic transition and consolidated democracy in Iraq 
by using some of these criteria comparatively. Berman and Bellin also indicate 
that Iraq is lacking a democratic history, and it is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, 
and multi-sect country. Moreover, they discuss that Iraq is suffering from 
economic problems.  
Some of the cases above, namely Germany and Haiti, are incomparable 
to Iraq because the state formation experience and the conditions discussed are 
not similar in those countries. In addition, some of the criteria mentioned above 
cannot be used for the Iraq case. In this context, this chapter examines Iraq as a 
unique case in which oil politics are directly affected by an ongoing war, the idea 
of promoting democracy, ethnic and sectarian conflicts and violence in that 
country, and the Global War on Terror. 
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C. THE IRAQ WAR, THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR AND PROMOTING 
DEMOCRACY 
Recent history shows that  the Iraq War and the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT) are new types of struggles that have the potential to last a decade or 
more.137 Success in these wars depends on controlling ethnic and sectarian 
violence, and on sharing oil revenues fairly. In this manner, it is clear that 
international support is needed in order to achieve success. In this long process, 
NATO is in Afghanistan to support the U.S. However, the international 
community is still questioning the need and strategy for the Iraq War and the 
GWOT.  
In addition, many people in the region believe that the U.S. had no 
justifiable reason to invade Iraq, and that the invasion violated international law. 
Those people also address that one of the main reasons for this invasion is the 
U.S.’s Middle East policy which is under the influence of Israel, and the Israel 
Lobby in the U.S. Mearsheimer and Walt also state that most of the decision 
makers of these wars were pro-Israel individuals and in the Lobby.138 “In fact, 
pressure from Israel and the Lobby was not the only factor behind the U.S. 
decision to attack Iraq in March 2003, but it was a critical element.”139 In this 
context, it can be said that many groups use this critical element in combination 
with many problems facing the U.S., Iraq, and the Middle East to exploit the 
current situation. This is especially the case with Al-Qaeda, other terrorist 
organizations, and “political Islamists” who use this critical element to increase 
polarization and extremism which have negative effects on relationships among 
the ethnicities and sects in Iraq, as well as religions and countries in the region. 
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Thus, it can be said that polarization and extremism increase violence in 
Iraq and in the Middle East, and raise racist, anti-U.S., and anti-Semitic 
approaches, which turns the Iraq question into a U.S.-Muslims and Israel-
Muslims problem. Many people in the region also see the war with Iraq as the 
first step in an ambitious campaign to remake the Middle East.140 Additionally, 
many people think that as a second step there are two threats ahead of them. 
These threats consist of a term — “moderate Islam” — used as a model for 
Muslim and predominantly Muslim populated countries, and a project — “The 
Greater Middle East Project” — used to promote democracy in the region. 
In this context, most secular people believe that the “moderate Islam” 
model is a threat to secularism, while many Muslims think the same for Islam, 
since the Koran has never been changed and there are no “moderate versions,” 
“regular versions” or “fundamentalist versions.” The Koran has only one type, 
which was sent by God. 
Many people also think that “The Greater Middle East Project” is a threat 
for the region. Those people believe that the main idea of this project is to 
change the borders of many countries, and that the changes will never help Iraq. 
Keeping this in mind, two dangerous scenarios discussed among the people are 
“to divide Iraq into three different countries,” and “to create an independent 
Kurdish state by dividing Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.” 
On the other hand, public opinion polls confirm that people from regional 
countries, including those from Turkey, a strong ally of the U.S., have an 
increasingly unfavorable view of the U.S. Middle East policy regarding support of 
the Iraq War and the GWOT. Figure 3 illustrates the Turkish public opinion on 
this matter.  
According to the results of the polls, people believe that: the U.S. has an 
image problem due to the Iraq War and the GWOT; the reasons for the current 
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conditions in Iraq stem from the U.S.; the Israel Lobby has a very big effect on 
the invasion of Iraq; and federalism is not a good solution for Iraq.141  
People also believe that the enemies in the GWOT are only the enemies 
of the U.S. and Israel; however, the enemies in the GWOT are dangerous 
terrorist organizations from all over the world.142 In this context, the Turkish 
people want to know why no global or widely accepted definitions for terror, 
terrorist, and terrorism exist. They also want to know why PKK/Kongra-Gel — a 
separatist terrorist organization with a strength of 4,500-5,000 active terrorists, 
3,000-3,500 in Iraq alone, and labeled as a terrorist organization by the U.S. — is 
not the enemy in the GWOT, while Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda and their affiliated 
terrorist organizations are branded as the enemies in this war.  
The results of the polls also reveal that the current situation increases a 
lack of confidence with the U.S. in the region. However, the U.S. needs 
international support in its long lasting struggle. Without international support, 
namely the support that comes from regional and global key actors, the U.S. 
cannot promote democracy, cannot win the GWOT, and cannot change the 
chaotic environment in Iraq.  
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D. FEDERALISM AS A THREAT 
Federalism, especially in combination with the chaotic environment 
discussed above, is a big threat to success in the Iraq War and the GWOT, and 
for promoting democracy in that country. There are many problems that cause 
federalism, causing it to be viewed as a threat. These problems, which will most 
likely cause an increase in ethnic and sectarian violence and may cause the 
collapse of the state, will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
However, it is difficult to fully discuss these problems in the limited pages of this 
thesis. 
1. Difficulties in Designing an Economic Strategy for Iraq 
It is difficult to design an economic strategy for Iraq, as the country is not 
fully ready for a post-war economy since the perspective of the country’s 
economy reflects a failed state, and a transitional, rentier, post-conflict, failed 
take on the economy.143 In this environment, a strong central government may 
control the economy by controlling the revenue, since it does not distribute the 
money to each religious, ethnic, or sectarian group. Otherwise, poor states will 
be potential risks to the stability. 
2. Ethnic Groups, Sectarian Groups, Tribes, and Extended 
Families vs. National Identity 
It is not easy to divide the cities and the oil areas among the religious, 
ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and extended family groups. In this turmoil, there is a big 
question of how the nation’s wealth is distributed in a federalism solution. “This 
has not only opened the door for over-ambitious, ethnically-based political 
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agendas, but for rivalry for the wealth that should belong to all Iraqis.”144 It also 
failed to stress the only glue, national identity, that holds that society together.145 
3. Ethnically Heterogeneous Cities and No Clear Lines Among 
the Groups 
Federalism creates neat partition lines; however, these lines are 
impossible because few regions in Iraq are ethnically, sectarian or religiously 
homogeneous. “The governorates of Diyala, Mosul, Salahaddin, Hilla, Kirkuk, 
and Basra are intermixed or have large minorities scattered throughout each 
province. In Baghdad, with probably a quarter of Iraq's population, the ethnic and 
sectarian groups are inextricably interwoven.”146  
4. Organization of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) 
ISF is based on ethnic and sectarian groups and it does not have a 
national identity. In fact, the units are based on sectarian or ethnic groups; 
however, most of the commanders of these units are not appointed from the 
same sect or ethnic group with the troops that they command. In this manner, it 
is difficult for a commander to command his troops.  
Besides the ISF, there are also ethnic and sectarian militia groups which 
have the potential to increase the tension in Iraq. Hamid Afandi, the head of 
Peshmerga for the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), one of the two major 
Kurdish groups, said, "if we can resolve this by talking, fine, but if not, then we 
will resolve it by fighting. We have 7,000 Peshmerga in Kirkuk, as well as 3,000 
in Mosul."147    
“In this context, federalism increases the militia problem, and threatens the 
security. Since, with no sign of discernible progress toward national reconciliation 
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on the horizon, there is an ever-increasing risk that U.S.-trained Iraqi soldiers and 
police will be used by Shi’a Arabs and Kurds to implement narrow parochial 
political agendas that exacerbate sectarian strife in Iraq.”148 
5. Oil Areas 
The oil map below in Figure 4 clearly indicates that areas that are 
predominantly Sunni Arab do not have enough oil. This is a very big risk in the 
federalism choice. In fact, the map shows that only the strong central government 
can distribute the revenues equally. 
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Figure 4.   Oil Map of Iraq149 
 
6. Constitutional Problems 
Besides the articles of the Iraqi Constitution previously discussed in 
Chapter II, Articles 117, 119, and 121 also have problematic areas, which causes 
federalism to be viewed as a threat. 
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a. Article 117150 
(1)  Second: This Constitution shall affirm new regions 
established in accordance with its provisions. 
b. Article 119151 
One or more governorates shall have the right to organize into a 
region based on a request to be voted on in a referendum submitted in one of the 
following two methods: 
(1)  First: A request by one-third of the council members of 
each governorate intending to form a region. 
(2)  Second: A request by one-tenth of the voters in each of 
the governorates intending to form a region.  
c. Article 121152 
(1)  First: The regional powers shall have the right to 
exercise executive, legislative, and judicial powers in accordance with this 
constitution, except for those authorities stipulated in the exclusive authorities of 
the federal government. 
(2)  Second: In case of a contradiction between regional and 
national legislation in respect to a matter outside the exclusive authorities of the 
federal government, the regional power shall have the right to amend the 
application of the national legislation within that region. 
 
 
                                            




(3)  Third: Regions and governorates shall be allocated an 
equitable share of the national revenues sufficient to discharge their 
responsibilities and duties, but having regard to their resources, needs, and the 
percentage of their population. 
(4)  Fourth: Offices for the regions and governorates shall be 
established in embassies and diplomatic missions, in order to follow cultural, 
social, and developmental affairs.  
(5)  Fifth: The regional government shall be responsible for 
all the administrative requirements of the region, particularly the establishment 
and organization of the internal security forces for the region such as police, 
security forces, and guards of the region. 
According to Articles 117 and 119, new regions can be 
established by the governorates. By the help of these two articles, and by the 
help of federalism, each religious, sectarian, and ethnic group will likely divide 
within themselves. since there is no unity within those groups. Every group has 
its own subgroups, tribes, and extended families. 
According to Article 121, Iraq is a loose type of federation. 
Additionally, the “regional governments” have their own security forces. Under 
these circumstances, it is easy to break down into a confederation or a more 
chaotic environment. On the one hand, Iraq has a tribal society that consists of 
many ethnic and sectarian groups, tribes, and extended families; and on the 
other hand, the Iraqi War has indeed become a militia war, and worse, the 
militias in Iraq resemble insurgent groups in advanced stages of development.153 
7. The Kirkuk Issue 
As discussed in Chapter II of this study, as all eyes are turned toward 
efforts to stabilize Iraq, the conflict that has been percolating in Kirkuk remains 
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dangerous and dangerously neglected.154 That struggle is equal parts street 
brawl over oil riches, ethnic competition over identity between Kurdish, Turkmen, 
Arab and Assyrian-Chaldean communities.155 However, this city cannot be 
divided among the groups since the groups are interwoven. In this context, only 
the strong central government can control this city by distributing the revenues 
equally. 
8. Dreams of the Kurds Probable Results of these Dreams, and 
Control of Basra among the Shi’a Arab Groups 
More than ninety percent of Iraq's government revenues come from oil 
exports. The Sunni Arab west has no developed oil fields and thus would have 
no oil revenues. In this situation, Kurds have many dreams of taking the biggest 
part of oil revenues to establish an independent government. In this context, as a 
first step, the Kurds are moving systematically to increase their control of Kirkuk 
to guarantee annexation of all or most of the city and province into the “KRG” 
after the constitutionally mandated referendum scheduled to occur no later than 
December 31, 2007.156 “In fact, the Kurds want the northern oil fields, but have 
no legitimate claim to them and no real way to export the oil they produce. In 
addition, control of Basra would also be an issue, with various Shi’a Arab groups 
looking to separate and take control of the oil in the south.”157 
9. Current and Potential Pipelines and their Security Problems 
Figure 5 clearly shows that the current pipeline system has security 
problems in today’s chaotic atmosphere. Federalism will likely increase this  
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problem since many different religious, ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and extended 
family groups live near these pipelines. This would likely be the case with any 
future potential pipelines as well.  
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10. The Need for New Oil Refineries 
Iraq has only three big refineries located in Baiji, Basra, and Daura, all of 
which still have a lack of capacity and security.159 “Additionally, as well as being 
costly, the supply of imported fuels cannot be relied on. Deliveries from Syria and 
Jordan, which border on the volatile Anbar governorate, have come to a halt 
because of the instability.”160 In the chaotic environment, it is also difficult to build 
new refineries, which the federal states have an extreme need for. Thus, it will be 
a big problem ahead for federalism. 
11. The Need for and the Results of Foreign Aid 
The United States and many other countries give considerable aid to Iraq. 
The main reason of this aid is to increase the country’s economic growth, reduce 
poverty, and to promote democracy in the country. However, it is not easy to 
reach this goal in a federal system for several reasons.  
First, there is a risk that foreign aid may create new warlords with the 
money given to the local criminal leaders instead of the central government. 
Additionally, If the money is controlled by one of the extended 
families/tribes/clans/ethnic or sectarian groups, it could create more extremism 
and terrorism instead of decreasing terrorism. Foreign aid may also be controlled 
by the terrorists or may be used to benefit them. Since there is no global 
definition of terrorism, one or more states may incline to define the terrorists as 
the freedom fighters, and use this money for the benefit of terrorists. In this 
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E. ASSESSMENT 
One of the major debates on the fair oil distribution in Iraq centers on the 
type of government by asking which form of government is better for that country: 
a strong central government or a federal system. However, the current form of 
government is defined as a “single federal state” in the Iraqi Constitution. 
Ideas and opinions on this issue vary among the different Iraqi and 
international groups and among scholars as well. However, this study strongly 
recommends the strong central government system to help cease the ongoing 
conflicts in that country and to distribute the oil revenues equally. In this context, 
constitutional amendments are needed to replace the single federal state, which 
is a kind of loose federation, or resembles a type of confederation with a strong 
central government in the Iraqi Constitution.  
Otherwise, federalism, in combination with the ongoing and potential 
problems discussed above, will likely cause an increase in ethnic, sectarian, and 
ethnosecterian conflicts in that country. There are many religious, ethnic, 
sectarian, tribal, and extended family groups who lack democracy experience, 
but are eager to run the government or governmental institutions to gain the 
many advantages for their own groups in that country. Additionally, in order to 
bring people together in terms of improved governance, political participation, 
pluralism, human rights, political reforms, and local security, more democratic 
rules are needed in that country. 
On the other hand, despite the extreme conditions discussed above, the 
people of that country need each other; however, there is still only the 
collaboration of groups, not a national identity. In this light, in addition to 
democracy, secularism can also play a role as the foundation for the integration 
of different groups under a national identity in a strong central government type. 
If this basis cannot be utilized properly, many different groups in that country will 
not likely be able to cohabitate, the people who speak different languages will not 
likely reside together, and elusive peace will not likely be reached. 
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Additionally, a strong central government is needed for the destiny of holy 
cities and oil-rich cities. Many cosmopolitan cities are important for various 
religions and sects, and many other cities are important for oil-richness, but these 
cannot be partition among various groups. 
In summary, in combination with other problems, this increases ethnic and 
sectarian violence and may lead to the collapse of the state. Thus, federalism is 
a big threat for the stability of Iraq and for the stability of the entire region as well. 
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IV. DIRECT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM – DIRECT PAYMENTS TO 
THE POPULATION 
A. INTRODUCTION — DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM 
The United States, the international community and, much more 
importantly, the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi people continue to debate on the 
country's future: specifically, on how to handle its vast oil wealth.161 In response 
to these arguments, there are proposals to redistribute a portion of oil revenues 
directly to the population on a per capita basis. In this context, scholars argue 
that these proposals have the potential to give all Iraqi citizens a stake in the 
nation’s chief natural resource. Scholars also indicate that a direct distribution 
system can bring equal distributions for every man and woman, and help to heal 
the insurgency problem.162 On the other hand, they emphasize that it would take 
time to develop a fair distribution system.163  
Though these proposals vary, they mostly stem from the systems used in 
the U.S. state of Alaska and the Canadian province of Alberta. In other words, 
direct distribution arrangements have been in place in both Alaska and Alberta. 
The older of these — the Alaska Permanent Fund — has been in place since 
1976 and is widely perceived as a success. The fund receives about 25% of the 
state’s oil revenues (along with other discretionary transfers from the state 
budget) and annually distributes a share of the accrued interest to all state 
citizens in the form of a dividend.164 
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In this context, this chapter discusses the proposals of a direct distribution 
system, and the advantages and disadvantages of such a system. Ultimately, it 
evaluates and compares these advantages and disadvantages to reach a 
conclusion on the subject. 
B. PROPOSALS FOR A DIRECT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
The first proposal of a direct distribution system came from Clemons in 
April 2003.165 “The proposal is that Iraq should save a fixed portion of its oil 
revenues, which would be invested in a portfolio of international equities and 
bonds. This portfolio would effectively become the national trust fund, and the 
fund’s income would be distributed to Iraqi citizens on an annual basis.”166 
“These payments would make a huge difference to families in a country whose 
per capita gross domestic product rests at about $2,500. More importantly, 
Clemons felt that by spreading capital broadly among new stakeholders, the plan 
would also prevent a sliver of Iraq’s elite from becoming a new kleptocracy.”167 
Palley also has an alternative on the issue. In his proposal, he mentions 
making distributions to only adult citizens. “Iraq has a population of approximately 
twenty-five million, of which seventeen million are adults. Again assuming a 
distribution of $2.75 billion (i.e., 25% of $11 billion), this would translate into a 
larger estimated payment of approximately $160 per adult — a bonus equal to as 
much as 10% of the average Iraqi’s income.”168 Palley felt that his plan would 
obtain political buy-in of citizens, and it would also not cause an increase in the 
rate of population growth.169 
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Frederick D. Barton, Senior Advisor of the International Security Program 
for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has another proposal in a 
hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations in the United States Senate. 
His proposal is a two-part plan. “The first part is to give Iraqis a direct stake in 
maximized production by instituting a wealth-sharing plan where each Iraqi family 
receives a certain amount of money in a personal account every year to spend 
on health, education, or livelihood.”170 In the second part of the plan, he 
proposes to develop a board of overseers comprised of Iraqi officials, local and 
international partners, and Iraqi civilians that could be charged with directing a 
portion of the oil revenue to Iraqi public goods and tangible infrastructure 
projects.171 He believes that such a plan would capitalize a fledgling banking 
industry, would increase incentives for Iraqis to assist their government and 
coalition forces in protecting the oil infrastructure, would help with the security 
situation, and help to create democratic governance.172 
Kenneth M. Pollack and the Iraq Policy Working Group of the Saban 
Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution have an alternative 
plan. They propose a five-basket solution for the oil revenue sharing plan, which 
contains the direct distribution system.  This plan is depicted below in Figure 6. 
They mention that the money should not simply be paid directly to every Iraqi 
household, but would be better deposited in individual bank accounts earmarked 
for specific purposes, education, retirement, healthcare, etc., that could either be 
determined on a country-wide basis by the Council of Representatives or left up 
to individual Iraqis themselves (preferably the latter).173 They also discuss an 
alternative, though they admittedly do not like this alternative. “Alternatively (or 
perhaps additionally), revenues directly to the people could be used to eliminate 
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the food rations that Iraqis still receive from the central government. This is a 
horribly inefficient use of resources, and it would be much better to put the 
money in the hands of Iraqis and allow them to decide what they want to eat, 
thereby removing the corrupt and inefficient central bureaucracy from this 
necessity of life.”174 
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C. POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF A DIRECT 
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
Keeping these proposals in mind, there are good reasons both for and 
against a direct distribution system. The beneficial economic, social, and political 
effects of a direct distribution may likely occur as follows: 
• The system may monetize the rural economy of Iraq and create 
markets for the poor, which could facilitate poverty alleviation.  
• It may also encourage a local credit market since some people 
would save part of their distributions. This could bring interest rates 
down, helping local investment.176 
• With the help of the system, the people of Iraq will have a choice in 
how to spend it, thus market forces may be able to operate more 
efficiently. 
• Another advantage of the system is that it is likely to encourage 
efficiency in the oil industry. Since the size of payments to citizens 
will depend on the efficiency of the oil industry, this should 
contribute to political pressure to improve efficiency.177 
• By giving the Iraqi people a direct stake in oil revenues, it may 
energize Iraqis to oppose both types of corruption from organized 
crime and from the insurgents who steal the oil and its revenues 
and destroy the oil infrastructure.178 
• It may transfer some of the decisions about how to invest resources 
to the people who are most affected by those decisions, and who 
are best informed to make those decisions.179 
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• The system may also avoid the imbalance of economic and political 
power associated with private control of revenues. Moreover, it 
instantly and may substantially increase per capita income.180 
• Putting the money into special bank accounts may capitalize Iraq’s 
banking system.181  
• By giving the Iraqi people a direct stake in oil revenues, the system 
gives citizens a more direct way to view their government’s 
performance, and hence may force the government to become 
more democratic and less corrupt and accountable. 
• Additionally, a direct distribution system may bring equal 
distributions for every man and woman, and help to heal the 
insurgency problem. 
On the other hand, the disadvantages of direct distribution system may 
likely occur as follows: 
• It is clear that oil dividends will reduce the amount of funding 
available for public infrastructure, health, and education spending. 
However, as a developing country, Iraq has huge needs in these 
areas — particularly after two decades of war and economic 
sanctions.182 In this context, it also may cause macroeconomic 
instability. 
• Another disadvantage of the system is that citizens may use the 
money unwisely, leading to inefficient allocations of expenditures to 
consumption and investment or to suboptimal investments.183 In 
this context, it will likely cause high inflation. 
• Iraq will need a big and reliable database cataloguing all of its 
citizens; however, this seems impossible in the near future. On the 
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other hand, without such a database, corruption and political 
interference will likely occur. Ultimately, the democracy culture of 
Iraq is not similar to countries who have used the system efficiently, 
namely the U.S.A. and Canada. 
• Additionally, if Iraqis only get a few cents per month from direct 
distributions, it is likely to be seen as a joke, and probably as proof 
that the system is still deeply corrupt.184 
• An oil dividend entitlement may also produce a national epidemic of 
laziness.185 In other words, cash salaries may produce 
disincentives for workers to supply labor, leading to greater 
shrinking of the non-oil sector and an even greater dependence of 
the economy on oil rents.186 
• Another disadvantage of the system is possible population growth. 
The possibility of this effect is contingent on specification of the 
eligibility requirement. In particular, if all citizens — including 
children — are eligible, this could provide an incentive for Iraqis to 
have more children, which will likely cause a need for even faster 
job growth in a country and region with high unemployment.187 
D. ASSESSMENT  
In addition to the constitution and federalism arguments, there are 
proposals to redistribute a portion or the entire oil revenues directly to the 
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used in the U.S. state of Alaska and the Canadian province of Alberta, and they 
have the potential to give all Iraqi citizens a stake in the nation’s chief natural 
resource.188  
These scholarly proposals vary in many ways. Scholars argue over the 
percentage of money that will be distributed. Some scholars propose to distribute 
all or most of the money, while others propose to give only a portion, at most 20-
25%, of the oil revenues. On the other hand, scholars also argue about whom the 
money will be given to. Some of them argue to give the money to the all citizens, 
while others propose to distribute the oil revenues only to the adults. Another 
argument among scholars is the type of distribution system. Some scholars 
argue that it would be the only system to distribute the oil revenues, while others 
think that it would be part of a basket system.  
Another key issue of the argument is the advantages and the 
disadvantages of the system. By giving the money directly to the people, the 
system may facilitate poverty alleviation, and may reduce the amount of 
governmental funding available for public infrastructure, health, and education 
spending. It may also bring a more democratic atmosphere to that country, and 
may help to solve many problems in Iraq, such as human and women’s rights, 
corruption, and organized crime. Additionally, the system may help to heal the 
insurgency problem.  
On the other hand, the system has many disadvantages. For example, it 
may cause macroeconomic instability, high inflation, may fail to prevent 
corruption and organized crime, and may also cause uncontrolled population 
growth. Additionally, it is clear that it would take time to develop such a 
distribution system. In this context, it seems that this system cannot yield a fair oil 
distribution unilaterally. This is due in part to the fact that there is no institution in 
Iraq at present with the capability of properly implementing such a distribution  
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system. “It would take substantial time to establish, and would have to be based 
on a well-developed state census and income tax system, which Iraq currently 
lacks in a direct distribution system.”189 
Additionally, if this system is used unilaterally, it will likely cause old 
problems to remain without any solution, cause new problems, and increase the 
magnitude of current problems. This is because there are many sectarian, ethnic, 
tribal and extended family groups that lack democratic experience. In this 
context, these groups, gangs, criminal organizations, and corruptible bureaucrats 
may put pressure on the individuals, the dividends of oil revenues, and/or steal 
and corrupt the money of these individuals. 
On the other hand, a strong central government can successfully utilize 
the direct distribution system. In this context, there are several critical issues to 
execute the system successfully. These are to establish a strong and reliable 
distribution institution under the strong central government, to conduct a reliable 
census urgently, to use only 20-25% of the oil revenues, to distribute the money 
to all adults — both men and women — equally, to open an account for each 
individual, and to put the money directly in to these accounts. Additionally, the 
money received by dividends should be exempt from taxation, and should be 
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A. MAIN CONSIDERATIONS 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in his speech on March 7, 2007, 
mentions that the words "civil war" oversimplify a very complex situation in 
Iraq.190 In fact, as we move into the fifth year of conflict in Iraq, it is difficult to find 
a great deal of cause for optimism, since every day hundreds of innocent people 
lose their lives due to ongoing ethnic and sectarian violence in Iraq. Moreover, 
the causalities of the Multi-National Forces, predominantly those of the United 
States, are increasing.  
In this chaotic environment, many people believe that immediate and long-
term growth depends predominantly on the oil sector.191 However, there are 
many intermingled problems facing Iraq that are causing an increase in violence 
in that country, most of which stem from the oil and the possible oil distribution 
scenarios of the oil revenues. 
On the other hand, the complexity of these problems increases because of 
the new type of multifaceted war, which is expected to last longer than the 
previous ones.192 This modern warfare has many facets: cross-cultural 
relationships, psychological operations, Special Forces, air force with space 
capabilities, precision weapons, human intelligence, humanitarian aid, civil-
military cooperation, public affairs, network centric warfare, intelligence 
operations, logistics support, aircraft carriers, AWACS, and many other 
complicated systems. Additionally, media is effecting the warfare environment. 
Keeping the properties of a multifaceted warfare environment and the 
serious problems mentioned above in mind, it is necessary to understand the 
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importance of the Middle East to make an approach for fair oil distribution in Iraq  
since the Middle East has enormous importance in world politics. Sixty-five 
percent of the world’s oil is in the Middle East. This oil is the lowest cost oil in the 
world, and the entire world needs this oil. On the other hand, the Middle East is 
the place where the major religions originated. Today, many religions and many 
countries perpetuates their existence in the region. Additionally, it contains many 
sanctuaries, which may cause conflicts or important dialogs among the people 
and countries. 
In this special region, every religion, every belief, and every country has a 
right for survival; however, there are many problems and threats ahead of that 
right that stem from the region, especially the chaotic environment in Iraq. Public 
opinion polls discussed in this study also confirm the situation.  
In sum, it is extremely important to find a solution for the Iraq question, 
especially the question of the oil curse. In this context, the previous chapters of 
this thesis and the following paragraphs offer an approach for an ideal oil 
distribution scenario. Additionally, this thesis explains possible modifications of 
the Constitution of Iraq and new Iraqi Hydrocarbon/Oil Law. It also makes many 
recommendations to help form the solution. 
B. IDEAL OIL DISTRIBUTION SCENARIO: WHAT WOULD BE THE BEST 
SYSTEM AND WHY 
One of the major debates over fair oil distribution in Iraq centers on the 
type of government by asking which form of government is better for that country: 
a strong central government or a federal system. However, it is considered a 
“single federal state” in the Iraqi Constitution.  
On this issue, ideas and opinions vary among Iraqi and international 
groups, and among scholars as well. However, this study strongly recommends a 
strong central government to help cease the ongoing conflicts in that country and 
to distribute the oil revenues equally. Federalism, especially in combination with 
the chaotic environment discussed in this thesis, is a big threat to the success in 
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the Iraq War and the GWOT, and to promoting democracy in that country. 
Additionally, it is clear that there are many problems that cause federalism, 
leading it to be viewed as a threat. These problems, which will most likely cause 
an increase in the ethnic and sectarian violence and may possibly cause the 
collapse of the state, are: 
• Ongoing ethnic and sectarian violence;  
• Disinformation which affects the decision makers’ ideas;  
• Lack of national identity due to ethnic and sectarian groups, tribes, 
and extended families;  
• Organization of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), which is far from a 
national identity;  
• Kurdish aspirations and probable results of their dreams;  
• Results of the 2005 elections, which were affected by cheating;  
• Oil distribution scenarios without any dependable census since 
1957;  
• Difficulties in designing an economic strategy for Iraq;  
• Geographic locations of oil reserves relative to ethnic populations 
— absence of oil in the Sunni Arab dominated areas;  
• Insufficiency of current pipelines and their security;  
• Ownership of Kirkuk;  
• The need for new oil refineries and their related security problems; 
• Multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian cities and impossibility of any 
possible division or partition attempts for those cities; 
• The importance of the holy cities for regional and global people; 
• Constitutional problems, especially stemming from Articles 111, 
112, 117, 119, 121, and 140; 
• Need for foreign aid and the possible negative results of foreign aid. 
In this context, constitutional amendments are needed to replace the 
single federal state, which is a kind of loose federation that resembles a type of a 
confederation, with a strong central government in the Iraqi Constitution.  
 74
Otherwise, federalism, in combination with the ongoing and potential 
problems discussed above, will likely cause an increase in the ethnic, sectarian, 
and ethno-sectarian conflicts in that country. This is due in part to the fact that 
there are many religious, ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and extended family groups 
lack of democracy experience who are eager to run the government or 
governmental institutions to gain the many advantages for their own groups in 
that country.  
Additionally, despite the extreme conditions discussed above, the people 
of that country need each other; however, there is still only the collaboration of 
the groups, not a national identity. In this context, to bring the people together, 
democracy and secularism can play a role as the basis for the integration of 
different groups under a national identity in a strong central government type. If 
this foundation cannot be used properly, many different groups in that country will 
not likely be able to cohabitate, the people who speak different languages, have 
different religions and from different sects will not likely reside together. 
Moreover, a strong central government is needed for the destiny of holy 
cities and oil-rich cities. Many cosmopolitan cities are important for various 
religions and sects, and many other cities are important for oil-richness and these 
cannot be partition among various groups. 
On the other hand, a strong central government is not enough to bring 
about the elusive peace. In addition to a strong central government, a special 
type of direct distribution system, which should only be temporary to prevent the 
negative effects of the system, can be used to assist with the problems. In this 
context, there are several critical issues to execute the system successfully. 
These are: to establish a strong and reliable distribution institution under the 
strong central government; to urgently conduct a reliable census; to use only 20-
25% of the oil revenues; to distribute the money to all adults (both men and 




directly in to these accounts. Additionally, the money gained by the dividends 
should be exempt from taxation, and should be monitored by both the people of 
Iraq and the international community. 
C. POSSIBLE MODIFICATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND OIL LAW 
Unless amended, the Iraqi Constitution and the New Hydrocarbon/Oil Law 
will most likely play a significant role in structuring both production and revenue 
developments in the oil sector. Specifically, the Iraqi Constitution has the 
potential to damage the country’s oil politics and fragile efforts to stop violence. In 
fact, many articles of the constitution increase the tension and violence, which 
threatens the fair oil revenue distribution in that country. The key provisions 
about oil are outlined in Articles 111 and 112; however, there are many other 
problematic areas in some other articles. In this context, it can be said that 
several actions on several issues may decrease the violence in Iraq, and may 
cause fair oil distribution.  
First, constitutional amendments, described in Article 142, to give the fair 
rights to the other ethnic and sectarian groups besides Shi’a Arabs and Kurds 
can be helpful to decrease the tension. These amendments should especially be 
made to Articles 111 and 112 since these articles appear to satisfy Kurdish and 
Shi’a Arab concerns and needs, but not those of others. “Furthermore, the 
constitution leaves open the possibility of abuse of economic power by the Kurds 
and Shi’a Arabs. Additionally, the constitutions’ lack of clarity on many oil issues 
such as production and distribution are also conducive to an atmosphere of 
corruption and the creation of failed rentier state.”193 
Second, the key issues for compromise on the Kirkuk issue can be: finding 
a fair solution for the resettlement problem, conducting a census by the view of 
international viewers, sharing the oil revenues of Kirkuk and other parts of Iraq 
fairly, and delaying the Kirkuk referendum for a certain period of time. The 
                                            
193 Looney, “Economic Consequences of the New Iraqi Constitution,” 374. 
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strategic importance of an area, if not recognized, will result in tremendous 
instability and violence, and the impact would be felt globally. The wealth must be 
used for the benefit of the whole country, as well as the entire world, instead of 
the benefit of any one ethnic or sectarian group. In addition, the problem should 
be solved with a consensus to bring stability and peace to the region and to the 
world. 
Third, as discussed above, other amendments, in Articles 2, 4, and 7, are 
needed to bring about secularism, a better democracy, and an Iraqi national 
identity for that country. Otherwise, there will be more extremism and less 
democracy in Iraq, and in the region as well. 
Fourth, the New Hydrocarbon/Oil Law should clearly be discussed, and 
should offer equal rights to all Iraqi citizens instead of the to regions. This is 
because the oil and gas resources are the property of the Iraqi people. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is extremely important to find a solution for the Iraq question, especially 
the question of the oil curse. This question, in combination with the problems in 
the Middle East, increases extremism and polarization among the religions, 
countries, ethnicities, and sects. They may also cause anti-Semitic approaches, 
as in the 1930s in Europe, among the U.S. and Israel and the Muslim world. 
Moreover, the extremism and polarization in combination with the ongoing 
situation in Iraq may lead to a larger, regional war in the Middle East. If a regional 
war occurs, it may have following results: 
• Bilateral separation by Kurds and Shi’a Arabs in Iraq provokes 
Iranian action. Iran may risk a war, including a nuclear conflict, 
against the U.S. The root of this argument is based in the differing 
mentalities of Kurds and Shi’a Arabs from the Iraqis. 
• The Kurds and Alawis, who are very strong in Syria and some of 
which have separatist ideas, likely affect Syria’s stability. 
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• Israel likely has closer ties with Kurds, and conducts covert 
operations against Syria and Iran as in previous194 conflicts, which 
may lead to a larger regional war. 
• Regional countries may have the same idea about Kirkuk due to 
Kurds’ desires, and this situation may cause crises in the 
international organizations, as in the 1956 Suez Crisis ordeal. 
• Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt have the potential to act differently 
from the other Muslim and/or Arab countries, as in the Lebanon-
Israel War in 2006, which may cause crises in the Arab League and 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference. 
• The European Union consumes almost 16% of the world’s oil, of 
which 10% originates from the Middle East, while the U.S. 
consumes more than 24% of the total, 12% from the Middle East.195 
In this context, the E.U., with the exception of France, can act to 
open its trade movement. French can act against the U.S., as in 
most of the previous crises, due to their concerns of domestic 
problems, namely the problems steming from its minorities, which 
can also cause new NATO and E.U. crises. 
• Russia, China, and France can mention the importance of the 
United Nations to solve the problem.  
• Russia can also act on the side of the Arabs due to concerns 
regarding the Chechnya problem.  
• China, which saw acceleration in its trade after joining the World 
Trade Organization, consumes almost 8.5% of the world’s oil, of 
which 4% comes from the Middle East.196 However, it will possibly 
consume more than 30% of world’s oil in the next three decades.197 
                                            
194 Fawn and Hinnebusch, The Iraq War, 192. 
195 British Petroleum Statistics, “BP Statistical Review.” 
196 Ibid. 
197 Oil Magazine, “Ministry of Oil, Kuwait,” August 2006 
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For this reason, it can act to find a better solution under the 
authority of the UN. China can also act to make its oil trade 
movement methods more open. Today, China’s main oil trade 
movement begins from the Middle East and passes through Asia. If 
this way is closed, China will transport the oil by a longer route, 
which transverses around South Africa, and will increase the 
production costs and decrease China’s economic strength. If that 
situation — which can cause the continuity of the U.S. hegemony 
— occurs, China will probably act with Russia and France, and 
potentially with other nuclear powers against the U.S. 
• The UN probably does not send peace-making forces to the crisis 
area as in the Balkans Crisis in the 1990s, and solely deploys a 
peacekeeping force afterwards. NATO can send forces; however, it 
will probably not send assets due to the crisis among NATO allies. 
This situation can also lead to speculation about the strength and 
utility of the UN and NATO. 
On the other hand, it is possible to solve the problems and to prevent a 
regional or global crisis. In this context, this study recommends eight things to do.  
First, the most important thing is to thoroughly understand the problems 
and evaluate the situation. If the problems are understood well enough, and the 
situation is precisely evaluated, elusive peace can be caught and can be kept in 
hand.  
Second, there should be compromise by meetings, as conducted in 
Baghdad and Sharma al-Sheikh in 2007, or direct talks among the 
representatives of all ethnic groups, as well as of the governments of Iraq, its 
neighbors, the U.S., and the other key regional and global actors. These 
meetings will likely help achieve a thorough understanding of the problems, and 
help to find better solutions for the current and potential future problems of Iraq. 
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Third, U.S. decision makers should seek strong international support to 
present a united front against the threats in Iraq, and to solve the problems in 
that country. In this context, internal and external dynamics of Muslim and 
predominantly Muslim populated countries are key elements for the solution. 
Improving the U.S. image would grant it further credibility and serve to improve 
relationships in these countries. This support should not only come from 
individual countries, but also from international organizations and regional key 
powers as well. 
Fourth, a strong central government is needed to help cease the ongoing 
conflicts in Iraq and to distribute the oil revenues in that country equally, since 
federalism, especially in combination with the chaotic environment discussed in 
this thesis, is a big threat for the success in the Iraq War and the GWOT, and for 
promoting democracy in that country. Additionally, it is clear that there are many 
problems causing federalism, which can be viewed as a threat. 
Fifth, a special type of direct distribution system, in addition to a strong 
central government, which should only be temporary in order to prevent the 
negative effects of the system, can be used to solve the problems. In this 
context, there are several critical issues, which are discussed in this thesis, 
necessary to execute the system successfully. 
Sixth, constitutional amendments, described in Article 142 of the Iraqi 
Constitution, to give the fair rights to the all Iraqi citizens — not just for the Shi’a 
Arabs and the Kurds — can be helpful for the fair oil distribution in that country. 
As discussed in Chapters II and III, these amendments should especially be 
made to the Articles 2, 4, 7, 111, 112, 117, 119, 121, and 140. 
Seventh, the key issues for compromise on the Kirkuk issue can be 
discussed in meetings and/or in direct talks among the representatives of all 
ethnic groups in Kirkuk, as well as of the governments of Iraq, its neighbors, the 
U.S., and the other regional and global key actors. These key issues include 
finding a fair solution for the resettlement problem, conducting a census by the 
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view of international viewers, sharing the oil revenues of Kirkuk and other parts of 
Iraq fairly, and delaying the Kirkuk referendum for a certain period of time. 
Eighth, the New Hydrocarbon/Oil Law should be clearly discussed and 
should offer equal rights to all Iraqi citizens, instead of only the regions, since the 
oil and gas resources are the property of the Iraqi people. 
These eight recommendations may not be sufficient to have a precise 
solution for fair oil distribution in Iraq. However, they are necessary for the 
solution. We can decrease and minimize conflict and violence by using these 
prescriptions and following a proper strategy. In fact, we have to do so since the 
people of Iraq and the people of the region, from many different ethnicities and 
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